Case Digest: Republic v. Sereno (G.R. No 237428) w/ Summary of Separate Opinions

Republic v. Sereno (including Summary of Separate Opinions) | G.R. No. 237428 | May 11, 2018 | Tijam, J. | Topic: Art. VIII, Sec 5 (other topics included in the full digest) |

SUMMARY: A petition for quo warranto was filed by the OSG assailing the appointment of CJ Sereno as Chief Justice on the ground that she failed to prove her integrity during the nomination process as she failed to comply with the SALN requirements of the JBC. Several groups and individuals filed Motions for Leave to Intervene, among them Senators De Lima and Trillanes. CJ Sereno filed a Motion to Inhibit against six Justices. The Republic argues that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy, as the Constitution does not make impeachment the exclusive mode of unseating an impeachable officer; (2) the petition is not time barred as prescription cannot run against the States; and, (3) that, at the time of her appointment, CJ Sereno was not of “proven integrity” she not having filed the required SALNs asked for by the JBC. CJ Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme Court, and that the word “may” pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment proceedings and not to the non-exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time barred considering that the one-year period has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that the Doblada doctrine, which state that the non-filing of the SALN must be proven as fact by the person alleging its absence, should be applied in this case; (4) she and the record-holding offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (6) her appointment is a political question; and, (6) the SALN requirement does not go into the requisite “proven integrity” but merely an instrument in its determination

The issue pertinent to Section 5, Article VIII is that W/N the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto against an impeachable officer and the answer is YES.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. 

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue is of transcendental importance, is one of first impression, and of paramount public interest. 

Moreover, the origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thus, there is no forum shopping in the instant case as the nature and purpose of the remedies are different, and there is yet no impeachment trial. 

In addition, Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Finally, quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character — it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court's constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's jurisdiction and the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution — it cannot rule on the constitutionality of an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court with jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being a political rather than a judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the land. Any attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power in the determination of whether the respondent's appointment is constitutional or not will, in point of fact, amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed constitutional duty and abdicate its judicial power. To do so would similarly amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts its judicial independence and equanimity to decide cases without fear or favor; without regard as to a party's power or weakness; without regard to personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our sacrosanct oaths as magistrates of this Court. Thus, they can take cognizance over the case.

FACTS:

1. From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning a period of 20 years, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the UP-College of Law, initially as a temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until her resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006. As a regular faculty member, respondent was paid by the month by U.P. While being employed at the U.P, respondent was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases).

2. Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from November 1986 to June 1, 2006, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains the SALNs for 1985, 1990, 1991,  1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, filed by respondent. On the other hand, the records of the Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by respondent for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003.

3. After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, the respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010. Respondent only submitted her 2006 SALN and it bears no stamp from the UP HRDO and it was signed on July 10, 2010 (which according to her it is a result of mere oversight since she only downloaded the pro-forma form and forgot to erase it). According to respondent, the JBC considered her nomination for the position of Associate Justice as that of a private practitioner and not as a government employee and thus, her SALNs were not required.

4. Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC stand, the only SALNs available on record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010.

5. A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by PNoy as Associate Justice, and on August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office as such. When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice

6. The JBC Announced that candidates for Chief Justice are required (a) for those in government service, to submit all previous SALNs; and (b) for those in the private sector, to submit SALN as of Dec. 31, 2011; and, execute a waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank accounts. However, this was amended by the JBC wherein the incumbent Justices are only required to file their previous SALNs and no longer require them to submit other documents.

7. Then Assoc. Justice Sereno was nominated by members of various legal and evangelical groups. She accepted the nomination. However, the Executive Officer informed the JBC that she had not submitted her SALNs for a period of 10 years (1996-2006) covering her employment in the UP College of Law. The Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (OSRN) through its then-Chief, Atty. Richard Pascual inquired as to CJ Sereno’s SALNs. In response, CJ Sereno sent a letter to the JBC requesting that her requirements be treated similar to those from the private sector alleging that (a) it is infeasible to get hold of the 15-year old records, (b) that UP has cleared her of all academic/administrative responsibilities, (c) she is considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government service anew from August 2010, her appointment as Associate Justice. Said letter, however was not examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated by the JBC En banc nor the Executive Committee.

8. CJ Sereno was listed as Applicant No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she had “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS. Letter 7/23/12 — considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She was interviewed for the post, was shortlisted, appointed by President Aquino, and took her oath of office.

9. In August 2017 or after 5 years, Atty. Larry Gadon filed with the House of Representatives - Justice Committee a complaint for impeachment against CJ Sereno for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that CJ Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs citing certifications from the UP Human Resource Development Office that only SALNs for intermittent years were filed by CJ Sereno and the certification from the Office of the Ombudsman that there is no SALN filed for the years 1999-2009.

10. The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine probable cause. During those hearings, incumbent and retired SC Justices were invited as resource persons. The SC en banc authorized the appearance of the Justices under strict confidentiality notice. Among the Justices who appeared before the Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted (a) CJ Sereno’s bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary Decentralized Office, (b) the suspicious issuance of the TRO in the Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege of Members of the Court to nominate for vacant judicial posts, and (d) the clustering of the Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice Peralta who testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson of the Council that nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice Bersamin; (4) Justice Tijam; and, (5) Justice Jardeleza.

11. The investigation before the House Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against the respondent.

12. The Office of the Solicitor General then initiated the instant case for quo warranto asking the court to declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold office for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and net worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures show that she does not possess “proven integrity” demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.

13. The Republic argues that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy, as the Constitution does not make impeachment the exclusive mode of unseating an impeachable officer; (2) the petition is not time barred as prescription cannot run against the States; and, (3) that, at the time of her appointment, CJ Sereno was not of “proven integrity” she not having filed the required SALNs asked for by the JBC.

14. CJ Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme Court, and that the word “may” pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment proceedings and not to the non-exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time barred considering that the one-year period has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that the Doblada doctrine, which state that the non-filing of the SALN must be proven as fact by the person alleging its absence, should be applied in this case; (4) she and the record-holding offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (6) her appointment is a political question; and, (6) the SALN requirement does not go into the requisite “proven integrity” but merely an instrument in its determination.

15. Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed Motions for Leave to Intervene echoing some or all of CJ Sereno’s arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed a similar motion alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court from the Senate Impeachment Court.

16. CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified before the House Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for his purported insinuations of CJ Sereno’s psychological fitness during the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also prayed that the Motion for Inhibition be by the SC En banc without the participation of the Justices who are asked to inhibit.

During the pendency of the case, and while she was on leave, CJ Sereno appeared in various fora and accepted several speaking engagements on the issue of judicial independence, and such other matters. (including the one held in ALS)

ISSUES:

1. W/N Motions for Intervention are proper. [NO]

2. W/N the Motions for Inhibition are proper. [NO]

3. W/N the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto against an impeachable officer [MAIN ISSUE]

4. W/N the petition is dismissible on the ground of prescription [NO]

5. W/N CJ Sereno is eligible for the position of Chief Justice [NO]

6. W/N CJ Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto. [YES]

7. W/N CJ Sereno violated the sub judice rule and is administratively liable [SUBJECT TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER]

HELD:

The motion for interventions cannot prosper since Intervention is not a matter of right but rests on sound discretion. The intervenors must establish the requisite legal interest.

• Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of right but addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b) that no delay or prejudice should result.
• Movant-intervenors failed to establish the required legal interest which must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual or material.Movant-intervenors’ sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in any way, come within the purview of the concept of “legal interest” contemplated under the Rules to justify the allowance of intervention. Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ motions are anchored on the contingency of the filing of the Articles of Impeachment. The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo warranto proceeding, by its nature, is one brought by a person claiming to be entitled to the usurped office.

Motions for Inhibition are not proper.

• The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
• In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of respondent does not make them disqualified to hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against respondent.
• A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public accountability.As to the act of wearing a red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and Bersamin's prejudice against her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate's performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental and should not be deemed a sufficient ground to disqualify them.
• Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador,” is clearly a hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court be if any of its Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin’s remark that he was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’ “privilege” to recommend nominees to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court.  It would be presumptuous to equate this statement to a personal resentment as respondent regards it.
• Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on Justice also contradicts respondent’s allegation that Justice Peralta’s apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice.  Justice Peralta has made it clear during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has already moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
• Justice Martires has not suggested that she suffers from some mental or psychological illness. At most, his questions and statements were merely hypothetical in nature, which do not even constitute as an opinion against respondent.Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent’s motions for inhibition must perforce fail.  Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor, should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

The Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto against an impeachable officer

• Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.
• While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue is of transcendental importance, is one of first impression, and of paramount public interest.

The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different

• Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that as a member of the Supreme Court, she is an impeachable officer. As such, respondent argues that a quo warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged against her, especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her. This is untenable.
• The origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. Thus, impeachment proceedings involved punishment of acts done during the term of the officials while quo warranto includes the legal right to hold the office in the first place

As to the forum shopping issue

• Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
• The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what authority." Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry. It determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment.
• An action for quo warranto may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.  That usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public interest in our jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor.

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding.

• Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
• In this case, there can be no forum shopping since the causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the forst place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
• Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, x x x, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, x x x." In short, respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy. SCaITA
• Moreover, "impeachment proceeding" before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the respondent.

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or in validly elected impeachable official may be removed from office

• Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses the permissive term “may” It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. The SC have consistently held that the term"may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
• To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
• Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.
• Further, the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice- President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.  Despite disloyalty to the Republic being a crime against public order  defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated as "other high crimes," constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly available.

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

• Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her offie, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.

The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

• An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to lose power is to abdicate it.

Judicial power versus Judicial restraint and fear of a constitutional crisis

• As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made dependent upon the action or inaction of another branch of the government. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced.
• For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of the resolution of the instant petition, no impeachment trial has been commenced by the Senate. In fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay lackadaisical, on the part of the Court to assume, at the time the petition was filed, that the House of Representatives will affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will eventually carry on.
• A constitutional crisis may arise from a conflict over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers. Thus, there can be no constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself provides the means and bases for the resolution of the "conflict." To reiterate, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit of its judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. In so doing, the Court is not arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine whether an impeachable officer may be removed by impeachment or not, which is a political, rather than a judicial, exercise. Ta
• Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character — it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court's constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's jurisdiction and the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution — it cannot rule on the constitutionality of an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court with jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being a political rather than a judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the land. Any attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power in the determination of whether the respondent's appointment is constitutional or not will, in point of fact, amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed constitutional duty and abdicate its judicial power. To do so would similarly amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts its judicial independence and equanimity to decide cases without fear or favor; without regard as to a party's power or weakness; without regard to personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our sacrosanct oaths as magistrates of this Court. Thus, they can take cognizance over the case.

The petition is not dismissible on the ground of prescription

• When the Solicitor General himself commences the quo warranto action either (1) upon the President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that there is proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or suffers an act which is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) an association acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.
• It is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its character as a sovereign. It is but more prudent to afford the Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to present their cases for a proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing the petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate consideration in providing for a one-year prescriptive period was public interest, so is it the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act nonchalantly and idly watch title to the public office in question be continuously subjected to uncertainty. Indeed, dismissal of cases on technicality is frowned upon especially where public interest is at the other end of the spectrum.

Ineligibility as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice

• The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. The Court's supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.The nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. Questions of policy or wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." It does not involve a question of policy but simply a determination, based on facts, of whether a candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not.
• The SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the Constitution and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws; and one who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be a person of integrity as such equation is theoretically and practically antithetical. The obligation of members of the Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not only a statutory requirement but forms part of the mandatory conduct expected of a judge so that an “honorable competent and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice and thus promote the unity of the country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the people.”
• While the U.P. HRDO, as the concerned personnel division, produced respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these very same SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. Even then, the Court presently receives the certified copies of said SALNs as evidence of the existence and the filing thereof. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. When the respondent is called upon at the suit of the State to show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of a public office, the burden of proving his title rests upon the respondent. When, however, the respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office, it is only at that time that the burden of evidence shifts to the State. In a quo warranto proceeding, the burden rests on the defendant or respondent, as against the State at least, to show his right to the office from which it is sought to oust him. Moreover, since the object of such proceedings is to test the actual right to the office, and not merely a use color of right, it is incumbent upon the respondent to show a good legal title, and not merely a colorable one, for he must rely wholly on the strength of his own title.
• Being on leave from government service is not synonymous with separation from government service. Suffice to say that one does not cease to become a government employee only because one takes an official leave. On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public officials and employees are required to file a SALN.
• Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or whose years in government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713. The clearance issued by UP HRDO hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing respondent of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as compliance with the SALN requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer, performing ministerial and administrative duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance with the filing of SALNs which is a statutory, and not merely an administrative, requirement.
• The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant's fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of public record and also determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment. Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
• Moreover, Doblada doctrine would not apply since in that case, Doblada presented a letter of the head of the personnel of Branch 155 that the SALN for 2000 exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency, the Court therein inferred that Doblada filed his SALNs.
• In respondent's case, while the U.P. HRDO, as the concerned personnel division, produced respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these very same SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. Even then, the Court presently receives the certified copies of said SALNs as evidence of the existence and the filing thereof. TE

Respondent is a De facto Officer

• The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. As such, respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice. Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.

Sub judice Rule

• The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to members of the Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation of due process when she herself chose to litigate her case before the media. when aggressive actions are taken against the Judiciary as an institution and clouds of doubt are casted upon the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially so when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this Court cannot be apathetic to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing to do is to stand and deal with it head on.
• The Court event enumerated the events wherein Sereno attended and said things that may prejudged the issue. They mentioned the forum on judicial independence held in ALS wherein Sereno said “Of my colleagues, I know that several of them, have had their qualifications, their inability to submit documentary requirements, waived, several of them. If the JBC was correct in saying that an attempt to submit requirements, that good faith should be accorded to the 14, including those against me, why am I the only one being singled out? “
• The public actuation of the respondent showing disdain and contempt towards some Members of the Court whom she dubbed as "Biased 5" later increased and modifed to "Biased 6" can no longer be tolerated. She may be held liable for disbarment for violating the Canons of Professional Responsibility for violating the sub judice rule by repeatedly discussing the merits of the quo warranto petition in different fora and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Court even before a decision is made, designed to affect the results of the Court's collegial vote and influence public opinion. This wrongful actuation exemplify a poor regard for the judicial system and may amount to conduct unbecoming of a Justice and a lawyer.
• Such actions, indeed, resulted to the obfuscation of the issues on hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor for judicial independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or otherwise, of respondent to sit on the highest position in the Judiciary.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Leonardo-De Castro, J., concurring

1. Motion for Inhibition is DENIED.

a. She truthfully answered the questions propounded by the House Committee on Justice.

b. The narration on the interaction regarding the withholding of forgiveness for respondent’s acceptance of the Chief Justiceship NEVER HAPPENED.

2. Respondent’s road to the Supreme Court began with false entries in her PDS

a. Respondent was not a CHR Deputy Commissioner because no such position exists.

b. Respondent was a lecturer of the Murdoch University and UWA but only in its Manila extension program.

3. Petition for quo warranto is proper because respondent’s appointment is void from the beginning.

Bersamin, J., concurring

1. Motion for inhibition utterly lacks merit and deserves denial.

a.     The allusion to a dictatorship in the Judiciary said before the House Justice Committee is hypothetical.

b.     Feeling offended regarding the withdrawal of privilege to make recommendations to vacant posts in the Judiciary cannot be equated to bias as it is a legitimate commentary against respondent’s leadership.

c.     Wearing a red tie during the Red Monday protest cannot be equated to bias as it is a mere piece of clothing.

2. Quo warranto is a proper remedy against a public officer ineligible for public office at the start. Impeachment is a remedy to oust a public officer for misconduct committed while validly holding office.

3. The statutes of limitation do not apply against the State as the State is enforcing a public right.

4. It is incumbent upon the respondent to show good legal right and not merely a colorable one, since he must rely wholly on the strength of his own title.

Peralta, J., concurring

1. The Chief Justice failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence Justice Peralta’s supposed actual bias against her concerning her qualification to be appointed as a Chief Justice

a. Already moved on from the issue of the non-consideration of Justice Peralta’s wife as Court of Appeals Presiding Justice.

b. Statements before the House Justice Committee are merely hypothetical. Merely testified based on my personal knowledge of relevant facts and based on authentic records of th JBC.

c. No personal knowledge of the disputed facts concerning the proceedigs. The issue in the quo warranto proceeding is different from the matters testified to before the House Justice Committee.

d. The testimony was with written authority from the Court En banc.

2. The Court has jurisdiction to hear the quo warranto case. There is nothing in Article XI, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution that states that said public officers may be removed from office only through impeachment. Courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers; otherwise, there would be  an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when he or she has been determined to be disqualified from the beginning.

3.  The burden of proof in a petition for quo warranto rests upon the respondent. Doblada does not apply.

4.  Respondent’s deliberate concealment from the JBC of the material fact that she failed to file habitually her SALNs during her stint as a UP Law Professor means that her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court is void ab initio, for she lacks the constitutional requirement of “proven integrity.”

Velasco, J., concurring and dissenting

1. Remedy of quo warranto is available to unseat, in the extremen, even an impeachable officer. However, respondent’s elegibility and qualifications have been passed upon by the JBC, As her nomination, which is a matter of public record, has not been timely challenged much less nullified the JBC’s findings on her eligibility and qualification should be respected.

2. The nullity if the JBC nomination is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for quo warranto against a member of the Supreme Court.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., dissenting

1. Integrity remains to be an immensely subjective term. It is the JBC which determines the parameters of “integrity.” Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and thus, a poltical question. It may only be reviewed by the Court through a petition for certiorari assailing the exercise of discretion of the JBC.

2. It remains questionable that the non-filing of one’s SALN is, by itself, enough to discredit one’s integrity.

Martires, J., concurring

1. Respondent has no valid appointment and is not the legitimate Chief Justice that the Filipino people perceive her to be. She is a mere de facto Chief Justice who can be removed from office through an action for quo warranto. The constitutional provision on impeachment as a mode of removing an impeachable officer from office only applies to a de jure and not to a de facto officer.

2. There are two reasons why the one-year period in Sec. 11 of Rule 66 cannot apply to the SolGen: first, the conditions that qualify the commencement of the running of the period, i.e. deprivation of the petitioner’s right to the public office and taking over such position which is usurped by another, do not apply to the SolGen or the State which he represents; and, second, prescription does not lie against the State.

3. Respondent embarked on what amounted to threates of future charges of the same nature against the other members of the Court. The respondent also addressed the Court in a condescending manner. She also attempted to mislead the public by making it appear that she was compelled by the Court to attend the Oral Arguments, when in fact, it was she who had requested for it.

4.  Justice Martires’ appearance before the House Justice Committee was sanctioned by the En banc. Further, the matters discussed in the interpallation which the respondent has interpreted to be “faith-shaming.” It would be incongruous for Justice Martires to consider Sereno as “sira ulo” on the basis of her religious beliefs because they are of similar faith and conviction.

Del Castillo, J., dissenting

1. The principles embodied in the Constitution’s language and design operate to deny the Court authority to assume jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition against an appointive impeachable officer. There are two classes of impeachable officers in Art. XI, Sec. 2: elective and appointive officials. An appointive impeachable officer who fails to meet the constitutional qualifications in the first place also commits an act that may amount to an impeachable offense.

2. The clear intent behind these safeguards is to enable the officials of these bodies to carry out their constitutional mandates free from political influence and pressure. If the unfettered power of the SolGen is allowed to be exerted against impeachable officers, the independence of these constitutional offices will effectively be undermined. By allowing quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers, the ponencia grants an RTC judge or CA Justices the power to order the removal of impeachable officers.

Carpio, J., dissenting

1. The repeated non-filing of SALN constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are grounds for impeachment under the Constitution. It is immaterial if the failure to file the SALN is committed before appointment to an impeachable office. It is up to Congress, which is the constitutional body vested with the exclusive authority to remove impeachable officers, to determine if the culpable violation of the Constitution or betrayal of public trust, committed before appointment warrants removal from office considering the need to maintain public trust in public office.

2. The burden of proof lies with the complainant, who is required to prove his case by substantial evidence. Once the plaintiff or complainant has established his case, by prima facie evidence, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant or respondent, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense. A certification duly issued by the official custodian that no SALN of a government employee is on file in the custodian’s office constitutes prima facie proof of non-filing of the SALN. Respondent failed to rebut the OSG’s prima facie evidence of her failure to file her SALNs for her years in employment with the UP College of Law. Doblada cannot apply because respondent did not file any countervailing evidence to cast doubt on the record keeping of the UP HRDO.

Leonen, J., dissenting

1. Granting a Petition for Quo Warranto against the Chief Justice is not the right way to address her inability to gain the respect of the branch of government that was entrusted to lead. It is tantamount to empowering the SolGen far more than any other cinstitutional officer. The SolGen will be granted the competence to what amounts to a reconsideration of the determination of the JBC and the President as to the qualifications of any appointed judge or justice.

2. The constitutional design is to balance the accountability of an impeachable public officer with the necessity for a degree of immunity while in service that will assure the independence inherent in a republican government. The process of removal through impeachment and conviction is reserved only for some officials. The process of removal is deliberately cumbersome. The ground for impeachment are weighty and serious.

3. There are two aspects of judicial independence: (a) decisional independence which focuses on the autonomy of the judge and his ability to render decisions free from political influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law; and, (b) institutional independence which refers to the collective independence of the judiciary as a body from unlawful and wrongful interference of other government branches.

4. The Court’s power of supervision over the JBC cannot be read as authority to interfere with the JBC’s discretion in performing its constitutional mandate, At most, the Court’s supervision is administrative in nature.

5. The doctrine of non-prescription against the State elucidated in Art. 1108 of the Civil Code pertains to the assertion of property rights, i.e. prescriptive and acquisitive prescription.

Caguioa, J., dissenting

1. Quo warranto, except only as explicitly allowed by the constitution to be filed against the President or Vice President under the rules promulgated by the PET, is not available as a mode of removal from office for impeachable officers by the clear mandate of Art. XI, Sec. 2.

2. Even assuming that quo warranto is available, the alleged non-submission of the SALN to the JBC is not a valid ground to question the eligibility  of the respondent, the SALN not being a constitutional requirement for the position of Chief Justice.

3. Even assuming that quo warranto is available, and that the nonsubmission or incomplete submission of the SALN to the JBC can somehow be raised to a level of a constitutional requirement, the one-year prescriptive period for the filing of quo warranto lapsed one year after the appointment of or assumption of office by the respondent as Chief Justice in 2012;

4. Even assuming again, that the non-submission or incomplete submission of the SALN to the JBC is a ground to disqualify the respondent from being placed in the shortlist, the records show that the JBC considered the submissions of the respondent Chief Justice as substantial compliance. Any defect in the exercise of discretion by the JBC should have been assailed via certiorari, prior to the respondent's appointment. This was not done and can no longer be done through this quo warranto petition.

5. Even assuming again, that the non-filing of the SALN under R.A. No. 6713 may lead to the removal from office of an impeachable officer, it cannot be done by quo warranto, but through the procedure in Section 11 ofR.A. No. 6713.

6. And finally, even assuming that quo warranto is available to remove an impeachable officer for violation of R.A. No. 6713 separate from the procedure provided in that law, the Solicitor General failed to prove the non-filing of SALN by the respondent — the evidentiary value of the Certifications from the University of the Philippines Human Resources Development Office (UP HRDO) and the Office of the Ombudsman having been destroyed by the discovery of other SALNs filed that were not found in the custodian's possession.