Pavlow v. Mendenilla | G.R. No. 181489 | Apr 19, 2017 | Anti-VAWC |
FACTS:
- Petitioner, an American Citizen,
is the husband of respondent’s (Cherry) daughter (Maria Sheila), a Filipino.
Petitioner and Maria got married in civil rites in QC. Three months into their
marriage, Maria Claims that petitioner was employing physical violence upon her
because of their quarrels with regard to petitioner’s infidelity. Maria claims
that petitioner always punched her and that she was made to take pills which caused
her to be unconscious. Respondent filed a complaint with the Assistant
prosecutor of Makati for slight physical injuries. But the same was denied
because respondent was not able to substantiate its allegations. Thereafter,
respondent, in behalf of her daughter, filed a Temporary Protection Order
against petitioner. The same was granted and the summons was forwarded to the
residence of petitioner. However, at that time petitioner was abroad. The
summons was forwarded to Tolentino, petitioner’s employee.
- Petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla’s petition alleging that the
case filed by Mendenilla was an action in
personam and at the time the summons was served, he was out of the country.
He theorizes that in cases where a temporary protection order is issued ex
parte by a trial court, the temporary protection order itself is the summons.
He adds that Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law and Section 15 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC stipulate personal service - and absolutely no other means of
service - of the temporary protection order upon the respondent. Thus, service
through Tolentino was ineffectual.
- Also petitioner claims that
respondent has no personality to file the petition for the issuance of a
protection order and that in filing such is a ground for forum shopping due to
the fact that the complaint for slight physical injuries were dismissed by the
prosecutor.
ISSUE:
1.) WON respondent has
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order under the
Anti-VAWC Law – YES
2.) WON respondent is guilty of
forum shopping - NO
3.) WON summons was properly
served on petitioner - YES
RULING:
1. &
2.) The
mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is
expressly given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection
order. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section
9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for
herself. The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence
proceedings on her own petition for the issuance of a protection order.
Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the prosecutor, does
not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance
of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria
Sheila's Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis
pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding of forum
shopping by her mother.
That there are three distinct
remedies available to victims of “violence against women and children”: first,
a criminal complaint; second, a civil action for damages; and finally, a civil
action for the issuance of a protection order. A civil action for damages may
be resorted to pursuant to Sec 36 of the Anti-VAWC Law. A protection order is
issued "for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child . . . and granting other necessary relief;" thereby
"safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in
the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the
victim to independently regain control over her life." Republic Act No.
9262 allows for the issuance of three (3) kinds of protection orders: a Barangay
Protection Order, a Temporary Protection Order, and a Permanent Protection
Order. A Barangay Protection Order is issued by a Punong Barangay or by a
Barangay Kagawad. Temporary protection orders and permanent protection orders
are judicial issuances obtained through trial courts.
As its name denotes, a temporary
protection order is a provisional relief. It shall be effective for 30 days,
following a court's "ex parte determination that such order should be
issued.” Within these 30 days, a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing
permanent protection order must be conducted.
3.) A protection order is not a
procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an initiated
action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which "prevent[ s]
further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of
[the Anti-VAWC Law] and granting other necessary relief." Protection
orders issued by courts come in two (2) forms: temporary and permanent. The
distinction, as their respective names denote, is their duration. A temporary
protection order is provisional, whereas a permanent protection order is
lasting or final. When a case is of
particular urgency, a trial court may ex parte issue a temporary protection order,
granting the reliefs under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law in the interim, that
is, for a 30-day period. Precisely because the case is of such particular
urgency that a temporary protection order is deemed necessary.
The information served on
petitioner is different, it does not pertain to the filing of an action but
merely to the schedule of an upcoming hearing. At no point does the Anti-VAWC
Law intimate that the protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent.
It has been emphasized that
residents who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring
that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend
to exigencies that may have arisen. This case pertains to alleged acts of
violence against a woman.
Petitioner was alleged to have
physically and psychologically assaulted his wife, Maria Sheila, on multiple
occasions. Maria Sheila was noted to have had to be confined in a medical
facility on account of petitioner's assaults. Maria Sheila's mother found
herself having to intervene to protect her daughter. The totality of these
entails an urgency which, by statute, justifies the issuance of a temporary
protection order even as the respondent to Mendenilla's petition was yet to be
heard. This is an urgency, which the Regional Trial Court actually found to be
attendant as it did, in fact, issue a temporary protection order.
Time was of the essence. The
exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how, by the
convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal
service was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service
of summons upon petitioner during his temporary absence through Monette
Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also resided at
petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then
validly acquired, and the dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's
petition on this score was correctly held by Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon to be
unwarranted.
Petition denied.
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