Case Digest: So v. Republic (G.R. No. 170603)

So v. Republic | G.R. No. 170603 | 29 Jan 2007 | Callejo, Sr. J. | Art IV (Section 1, Par 4) | Petitioners: Edison So Respondents: Republic of the Philippines Recit Ready Summary Herein Petitioner So filed for a Petition for Naturalization under CA No. 473 aka the Revised Naturalization Law.He presented 2 witnesses à fam business lawyer Atty. Adasa & UST classmate Mark Salcedo. RTC granted So’s petition. Respondent Republic of the Phil through OSG said not so fast! Coz SolGen claims na the 2 witnesses So presented did not know him (So) well enough and that they only gave general statements upon being asked about the character and moral conduct of So. CA set aside RTC’s decision. Hence, this present petition. The issue is W/N So qualifies for Philippines Citizenship and the Court said NO. It was wrong for So to claim that that RA 9139 should apply to his case instead of CA No. 473. This is because the latter applied to ALL ALIENS regardless of class while the former applies to nati...

Case Digest: ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Ermita (G.R. No. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, 168730) including MR

ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Ermita including Motion for Reconsideration | G.R. No. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, 168730  | September 1, 2005 | Austria-Martinez, J. |

Petitioners: ABAKADA GURO ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III

Respondents: THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,

FACTS:

  • Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court
  • RA No. 9337 (An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax, Amending for the Purpose Sections 106, 107, 108, 110, 114 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, As Amended, and For Other Purposes) was enacted to address the issues of mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits

    • Before RA No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et. al., filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of RA No 9336 amending 106, 107 and 108 respectively of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as it constitutes abandonment of the Congress of its exclusive authority to fix rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution
    • These provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been justified:  
    That the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions have been satisfied: 
    i. VAT collection as a % of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 ⅘%; or
    ii. National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 ½%.

  • Pimentel, Jr., et al filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing constitutionality of said provisions. Petitioners question the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that is amounts to non-delegation of legislative power. 
  • House of Representatives represented by Escudero filed petition for certiorari questioning the constitutionality of RA No 9337 on the ground that Sections 4, 5 and 6 constitute undue delegation of legislative power. 
  • IN SUM, petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (b), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: 
    • The Congress may, by law, authority, authorize the President to fix within the specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government.
  • They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale of goods and properties, cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute. 
  • ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., also argue that the law effectively nullified the President’s power of control which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Sec of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Sec of Finance.

ISSUES: W/N Sections 4, 5 and 6 of RA 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, constitute undue delegation of legislative power to tax? NO.

HELD:

1. On NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS:

  • The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegation are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power (which can never be delegated), has been described as the authority to make a complete law - complete as to the time it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable - and to determine the expediency of its enactment.  
  • However, general rule barring the delegation of legislative powers is subject to recognized limitations or exemptions, one of which: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution.  
  • In every case of permissible delegation, there must be showing that the delegation itself is VALID. It is valid only if (1) the law is complete in itself or (2) the law fixes a standard. 
  • In People vs Vera: “The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.” 
  • Thus, the legislature may delegate to executive offices or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.
    • Preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation.

2. The case is NOT a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent.

  • The legislature has made the operation of 12% rate effective Jan 1 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition → No discretion would be exercised by the President.  
  • The word “shall” is used in the common proviso. The use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order and imperative obligation, which is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 
    • Thus it is the ministerial duty of the President to impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by the Congress.

3. Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA et al that the law effectively nullified the President’s power of control over the Sec of Finance.

  • In making his recommendations to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Sec of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
  • Congress simply granted the Sec of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact.  
    • If either of the two instances has occurred, the Sec of Finance must submit such information to the President. Then, the 12% VAT rate must be imposed.   
  • THUS, there is NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER but only the discretion as to the execution of the law. 
DISPOSITION: RA 9337 is constitutional. Petitions are dismissed.

Motion for Reconsideration (October 18, 2005)

  • Petitioners Escudero, et al., reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand­ by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making.

 RULING:

  • There is no merit in this contention.

 HOLDING:

  • The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. 
  • Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. 
  • That Congress chose to use the GDP as a benchmark to determine economic growth is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.

DISPOSITION: Motions for Reconsideration denied with finality. TRO issued by the Court is lifted.

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