Case Digest: People v. Casido (G.R. No. 116512)

People v. Casido | G.R. No. 116512 | March 07, 1997 | Davide, Jr., J. | Topic: Article 7, Section 19 |

RECIT READY SUMMARY:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter Committee), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The Committee was constituted in line with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.

The issue of the case WON the release of accused-appellants is valid.

It was held that the release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon. The Court opined that while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

DOCTRINE:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

FACTS:

• The case started when the court released a resolution on 30 July 1996. The court ruled that the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal. They were re-arrested and REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt for approving the applications for the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the pendency of their appeal.
• Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter Committee) stated that the applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant of Conditional Pardon after the Secretariat had evaluated the crimes for which they had been charged in pursuit of their political belief. Such recommendation was approved by the President.
• They also allege that prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal which was received by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1996. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion to Withdraw their Appeal.
• There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the Constitution, but that what happened was a clear misappreciation of fact. Solicitor General additionally alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, in an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). They claim that the effect then is that since the amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction, the amnesty then granted to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin rendered moot and academic the question of the premature pardon granted to them.

ISSUE: W/N the amnesty rendered the question on pardon moot? YES

HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art. 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by
the amnesty, but not by the pardon.

DISPOSITION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was VALID  solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this case is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon and of its Secretariat are ADMONISHED to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to grant pardon or parole.