People v. Echegaray
| G.R. No. 117472 | February 7, 1997 | Per Curium |
Article III – Section 19 |
Petitioner:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent:
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
RECIT READY SUMMARY
The SC rendered a decision affirming the conviction of Leo Echegaray for raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime
having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time RA No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty
Law, was already in effect, he was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
W/N Sec. 19 absolutely abolished the death penalty.
The SC ruled in the NEGATIVE. The death penalty may be re-imposed by the Legislature provided that:
(1) That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter
case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime
to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.
W/N the death penalty is unconstitutional for being cruel, excessive, and unusual punishment.
The Court also ruled in the NEGATIVE.As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal
law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of
their private opinions. (People v. Limaco)
FACTS:
The SC rendered a decision affirming the conviction of Leo Echegaray for raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime
having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time RA No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty
Law, was already in effect, he was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
Echegaray timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that
precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, Leo Echegaray discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of
the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG). A supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was prepared by the FLAG on his behalf.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises 3 main issues: (first two are not relevant but refer to
footnotes for short SC explanation on them)
(1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings
(2) alleged incompetence of Echegaray's former counsel
(3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty? NO.
2. W/N the death penalty is unconstitutional for being cruel, excessive, and unusual
punishment? NO.
HELD:
1. One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil.
Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be
committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails:
(1) That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill; and
(3) That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.
Nothing in the Sec. 19 imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form
of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that the Death Penalty Law cites
that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes," for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
The Death Penalty law states that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes."
Heinous crime – one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
People v. Munoz – A reading of Section 19 (1) will readily show that there is really nothing which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, RA No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the
mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in RA No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are
admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their
heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under RA No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence
in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death
penalty in the crimes under RA No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
2. The US Supreme Court said, in Ex-parte Kemmler that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco – As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides
for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of
their private opinions.
DISPOSITION: DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Comments
Post a Comment