People v. Ylagan
| G.R. No. 38443 | November 25, 1933 | ABAD SANTOS, J.
| Article III - Section 21 - Double Jeopardy |
Plaintiff-appellant:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Defendant-appellee: ELISEA YLAGAN
Recit Ready Summary
Ylagan, defendant in this case, was charged in a Batangas court with serious physical injuries.
After the preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
Provincial Fiscal filed the pertinent information on the charge. On arraignment, defendant pleaded
not guilty. Thereafter, the court granted the private prosecutor’s motion to dismiss with concurrence
of the Deputy Provincial Fiscal. Eleven days later, the Acting Provincial Fiscal filed another
information in the same court of the same charge against the defendant. An information was again
forwarded and upon arraignment, thus the defendant pleaded that the charge was a double jeopardy
as per Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The issue before the Court is whether or not the recent charge against the defendant would
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy rule. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
This falls within the definition of Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for
the rule against double jeopardy. It states: "a person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is
dismissed or otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused."
Based on the aforementioned definition, the defendant had already been in “legal jeopardy” for the
offense for which she is now prosecuted again. Since there is a showing that Ylagan pleaded not
guilty in the first information, this would be considered as the first “legal jeopardy.” Thus, no
information of the same charge can be filed against the defendant without violating the double
jeopardy rule. The Court notes that the rule is provided as a way of protecting an accused from the
fear of endlessly being “molested with more complaints” putting one in “an equivocal and indefinite
legal situation.”
Citing Julia v. Sotto, the Court says that "without the safeguard this [rule] establishes in favor of the
accused, [the] fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and
whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
FACTS:
- In this case, defendant Elisea Ylagan was charged with a complaint of physical injuries at
the justice of the peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas.
- After the preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance,
where the Provincial Fiscal filed the pertinent information on the serious physical injuries
charge.
● On arraignment, Ylagan pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the private prosecutor with
concurrence of the Deputy Provincial Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case which the
court granted. There was no comment from the defendant’s attorney.
- Then eleven days later, the Acting Provincial Fiscal filed another information in the same
court charging the same complaint of physical injuries to the defendant. An information was
again forwarded and upon arraignment, thus the defendant pleaded double jeopardy as per
Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recent charge against the defendant would constitute a
violation of the double jeopardy rule.Yes.
HELD: The Court states that Ylagan has been in legal jeopardy with the earlier complaint. Thus, the
second complaint--which is just same complaint as the first--would therefore constitute a
double jeopardy thus violating Section 28 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure.
a. The concept of legal jeopardy is based on four standards wherein a defendant has
been placed in trial under the following conditions:
i. In a court of competent jurisdiction;
ii. upon a valid complaint or information;
iii. after he has been arraigned;
iv. after he has pleaded to the complaint or information.
b. Based on the aforementioned standards, the defendant has been once in jeopardy
for the offense for which she is now prosecuted again. Since there is a showing
that Ylagan pleaded not guilty in the first information, this would be considered
as the “first legal jeopardy.”
c. The Court also notes that while it stated in United States vs. Ballentine that there is
no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been commenced by
the calling of a witness, it is has now decided to retract such a view since such a
doctrine is nowhere found in any law (or in Sec. 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for that matter).
i. It is sufficient that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue
properly joined."
d. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of
second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense.
i. "Without the safeguard this [rule] establishes in favor of the accused, [the]
fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as
dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure. (Julia vs. Sotto)
ii. The rule assures the accused that he will not be further molested, or
need to prepare himself for the presentation of a new complaint. Thus,
it gives the accused full information as to what he may hope or fear, and
prevents his reasonable hopes from being dissipated as the result of an
equivocal and indefinite legal situation
2. The Court also finds no basis in the contention of the government’s counsel that the
previous case brought against Ylagan was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that
the phrase "without the consent of the accused", used in Section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or
"against the will of the accused."
a. The Court states that the mere silence of the defendant or her failure to object
to the dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of
Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
b. The right not to be put in double jeopardy is as important as the other constitutional
rights of the accused in a criminal case. Therefore, its waiver can not, and should
not, be predicated on mere silence.
Disposition
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered
DISPOSITION: The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
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